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In the negotiation literature we find two relatively distinct types of negotiation. The two types are known as integrative negotiations and distributive negotiations. Integrative negotiations are those where all sides are looking for solutions that are "good" for everyone while distributive negotiations are those where each party tries to maximize his gain. In this paper we are interested in argumentationbased integrative negotiations. More precisely we present a study characterizing the outcomes of such negotiations. For this reason, we aggregate the argumentation systems that the agents use in order to negotiate. The aggregate argumentation system represents the negotiation theory of the agents as a group and corresponds to the "ideal" situation of having access to complete information or negotiating through a mediator. We show that the aggregation operator we use is very suitable for capturing the essence of integrative negotiation as the outcomes of the aggregate theory we obtain have many appealing properties (e.g. they are Pareto optimal solutions).
Introduction
Negotiation is an important issue in multi-agent systems (MAS) field. Different approaches to automated negotiation have been investigated in MAS [7] , including game-theoretic approaches heuristic-based approaches and argumentation-based approaches
In the "classical" negotiation literature we find two relatively distinct types of negotiation. The two types are known as integrative negotiations and distributive negotiations [6] . Integrative negotiations are those where all sides are looking for a solution that allows everyone to walk away feeling like they won something. Distributive negotiations, on the other hand, are typically those where one party gets what he wants while the other party gives something up.
In this paper we are interested in argumentation-based integrative negotiations. More precisely, we consider negotiations that takes place between two (or more) agents on a set O of offers (or outcomes), whose structure is not known.
The offers may concern one or several issues. However the way that issues are fixed or combined during the negotiation is a matter of strategy and it is out of the scope of this paper. The goal of the negotiation is to find among elements of O, an offer that satisfies more or less the preferences of both agents. Each agent is supposed to have a negotiation theory represented in an abstract way. A negotiation theory consists of a set A of arguments whose structure and origin are not known, a function specifying for each possible offer (or outcome) in O, the arguments of A that support it, a non specified conflict relation among the arguments, and finally a preference relation between the arguments. The status of each argument is defined using Dung's acceptability semantics [5] . Our aim is to characterize the outcomes of such negotiations. In order to have the complete picture of the different possible outcomes we may obtain in such a framework, we study the "ideal" situation which assumes complete information between the negotiating agents. This could also correspond to the situation where a mediator receives the arguments of all the involved agents and tries to find the best compromise for them. For this reason, we propose a characterization of the outcomes which is based on the aggregation of the individual negotiation theories and which generates a single theory that contains the arguments that the agents have as a group. This allows a reasoning mechanism to identify the outcomes that are "good" for all the negotiating agents.
Thus, more concretely, we assume that each agent has a negotiation theory and an argumentation-based reasoning mechanism as they are originally proposed in [2] and further extended in [3] . Then we propose an aggregation of the negotiation theories in order to study the possible outcomes. The aggregation operator we are using combines in a simple and intuitive way the preferences of the different agents. More specifically, the preference relation of the aggregate theory compares only those pairs of arguments for which the agents' preferences agree (i.e. they have the same preference or they are indifferent), and regards as incomparable the ones on which they disagree (i.e. they have opposite preferences). It turns out that the outcomes of the aggregate theory have interesting properties we present in this paper.
The Argumentation System
The negotiation theories of the agents are represented as preference-based argumentation theories and are used in the negotiation process by an argumentation system introduced in [2] and further developed in [3] . It is based on two disjoint sets of arguments, one for supporting beliefs and one that supports offers or options. Here we concentrate on the analysis of argument structures supporting offers, and ignore completely arguments that refer to beliefs. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the results we present here carry over to the general case, with slight modifications.
In order this work to be self-contented we present here the basic elements of the negotiation theories. In what follows, L will denote a logical language, and ≡ is an equivalence relation associated with it. From L,
This means that the offers are distinct. Different arguments can be built from L for supporting elements of O. The set A will contain all those arguments. By argument, we mean a reason for supporting an offer. The structure and origin of the arguments are assumed to be unknown. Let F be a function that returns for a given offer o ∈ O, the arguments in favor of it. Thus, A = i=1,...,n F(o i ). There are two relations among arguments: 1. A conflict relation, denoted by R, that is based on the logical links between arguments. This relation is assumed to be weakly complete, that is irreflexive, symmetric and complete in the sense that any two distinct arguments are related by R. In fact, for two arguments a, b ∈ A, (a, b) ∈ R means that a and b are conflicting.
The arguments of the set A are therefore pairwise conflicting, representing situations where each agent has to decide in favor of one outcome i.e. the best for him and abandon the others. These situations are abundant in integrative negotiation where agents must at each time be able to decide about what they must defend and what they must abandon in order to reach a compromise. Therefore, the arguments that support the different possible alternative offers they may do are essentially pairwise conflicting. Arguments supporting the same offer are also considered as conflicting. The reason behind this idea is the requirement that the system should return at each time the most powerful argument among the several ones that support the offer under consideration. 2. A preference relation, denoted by , capturing the idea that some arguments are stronger than others. Indeed, for two arguments a, b ∈ A, (a, b) ∈ means that a is at least as good as b. At some places, we will also write a b. In what follows, the relation is assumed to be a partial pre-ordering (that is reflexive and transitive). The relation denotes the strict partial order associated with . It is defined as follows:
∈ . The formal definition of a weakly complete relation is as follows.
Before we proceed, let us start by stating some useful properties of the preference relation , that will be used throughout the paper.
Then, the following hold.
3. If a c and c a for some c ∈ A, then b c and c b.
The preference relation and the conflict relation are combined into a unique relation between arguments, denoted by Def and called defeat relation, as in [1] .
Definition 2 (Defeat relation). Let A be a set of arguments,
a pre-order on A, R a conflict relation and a, b ∈ A. a Def b iff:
Note that when the preference relation is empty, i.e. all the arguments are incomparable, then the relation Def coincides with R. Moreover, in the case of weakly complete systems, the relation Def is exclusively induced by the preference relation . Namely, Def can be defined in terms of as Def = (( ) C ) −1 , where S C is the complement of a binary relation S, and S −1 its inverse, defined as
While, in principle, this seems to suggest that the conflict relation is not needed in the framework, it remains for two reasons. Firstly, it more clearly illustrates the link between the preference relation and the Def relation. Secondly, the conflict relation plays a central role in the case where beliefs are included in the language (the conflict relation is not complete in that case), and therefore is an important ingredient of the complete framework.
The following result states some useful properties that highlight the impact of the preference relation on Def.
Notice that indifference obliterates the conflict relation. Indeed, if two arguments a, b are indifferent, then (a, b) ∈ Def and (b, a) ∈ Def. Hence, in a sense, the conflict relation applies only to arguments that are of different strength or incomparable. An argumentation system for negotiation is defined as follows:
A is a set of arguments that support these offers, a pre-order on A, and Def is a defeat relation defined from the weakly complete relation on A and , as described in Definition 2.
To simplify the notation, we may omit set O and the preference relation from the definition of an argumentation system, and denote it simply by T = A, Def . We use the two notations interchangeably. When the simplified notation T = A, Def is used, we refer to as the underlying preference relation of Def.
Note that to each argumentation system is associated a directed graph whose nodes are the different arguments of A and the arcs represent the defeats, i.e. elements of Def.
Among all the arguments, it is important to know which arguments to keep for making decisions. In [5] , different acceptability semantics have been proposed. The basic idea behind these semantics is the following: for a rational agent, an argument a i is acceptable if he can defend a i against all attacks. All the arguments acceptable for a rational agent will be gathered in a so-called extension. An extension must satisfy a consistency requirement and must defend all its elements. In the rest of the paper we assume that the reader is familiar with Dung's semantics and the possible statuses of arguments (i.e. skeptically or credulously accepted arguments and rejected arguments).
An argumentation system favors offers (or options) that are supported by either credulous or skeptical arguments. These offers are the "outcomes" of the system. Since the outcome of the system is determined solely by their supporting arguments, we can restrict our analysis to the properties of the arguments of the system.
Aggregating Argumentation Systems
Throughout this section, we assume two agents with the argumentation systems T 1 = O, A, 1 , Def 1 and T 2 = O, A, 2 , Def 2 , respectively. We capture the aggregation of two such argumentation systems in a new argumentation system U T1,T2 = O, A, , Def , whose defeat relation is the union of the defeat relations of the individual systems. 2 , Def 2 be the argumentation systems of two agents. The aggregate argumentation system or simply aggregate system of
Definition 5 (Aggregate Argumentation System). Let
To complete the picture of the aggregate argumentation system, we characterize the preference relation , underlying the defeat relation Def 1 ∪ Def 2 , in terms of the individual preference relations 1 and 2 . It turns out that the union of the defeat relations of the individual systems corresponds exactly to the defeat relation induced by the intersection (i.e. common preferences) of the individual preference relations 1 and 2 . We believe that this a suitable way to take into account the interests of the negotiating agents, which is a main point in the integrative negotiation, and corresponds to a cooperative approach to mutual problem solving. In order to present compactly this result, the following definition is needed. Consequently, the union aggregation of theories T 1 and
Note that the sets of options O is the same for both agents and the aggregate system. Following our convention, we denote omit O and the preference relations, and denote the individual theories by T 1 = A, Def 1 , T 2 = A, Def 2 , and their aggregate theory by U T1,T2 = A, Def 1 ∪ Def 2 .
Properties of Aggregate Systems
In this section we present the formal properties of the aggregate system defined in the previous section.
Although the defeat relation of the aggregate system needs not to be transitive in general, there are cases where subparts of this relation have this property. One such case is that of unidirectional chains that are defined formally below. As it will become apparent in the following, transitivity imposes a strong structure with significant implications. This is an important difference between the defeat relations that are investigated in this work and the attacking relations of the abstract framework of Dung, that lack specific structure. R on a set A is a sequence a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n of elements of A such that (a i , a i+1 ) ∈ R and (a i+1 , a 
Definition 7. A unidirectional chain of a binary relation
Based on the above definition, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 2. Every unidirectional chain of U T1,T2 = A,
The next theorem shows that the admissible arguments coincide with the self-defending ones. The notion of selfdefending argument is formally defined as follows.
Definition 8. Let T = A, Def be an argumentation system and let a ∈ A. Then
Formally, the correspondence between admissible and self-defending arguments is as follows.
The following theorem shows that aggregate argumentation systems are coherent (i.e. each preferred extension is also stable), which is an important property for argumentation systems. Similarly to the credulously accepted arguments of an aggregate system, the skeptically accepted ones can be characterized concisely by their properties. Indeed, these arguments are exactly those that have no defeaters. These arguments have in-degree 0 in the graph associated with this system. (Recall that the in-degree of a node in a directed graph is the number of arcs that have this node as sink in the graph). If a is argument of an argumentation system T , its in-degree in T is denoted by in T (a). It is important to notice the computational implications of the properties of the credulously and skeptically accepted arguments. Checking whether an argument a is a credulous conclusion of an aggregate system T is equivalent to checking whether it is self-defending, a computation that can be performed in polynomial time. Similarly, to check whether an argument is a skeptical conclusion, it suffices to verify that it has no defeaters, a computation that is also polynomial. Contrast, this polynomial time algorithms with the intractability results known for general argumentation frameworks.
Another property of the extensions of aggregate argumentation systems is that every member of such an extension is incomparable to any other element of any other such extension. Formally this is stated as follows. Theorem 6. Let T 1 = A, Def 1 and T 2 = A, Def 2 be argumentation systems, E 1 , . . . E k be the extensions of the system U T1,T2 = A,
To complete the picture of the structures arising in aggregate argumentation systems, we prove that the stable extensions of these systems are disjoint. Combined with the previous result, this basically means that incomparability partitions the set of self-defending arguments into different extensions. Theorem 7. If T 1 = A, Def 1 and T 2 = A, Def 2 are argumentation systems, the stable extensions of the system U T1,T2 = A, Def 1 ∪ Def 2 are disjoint.
From the above it follows immediately that U T1,T2 has a skeptical conclusion iff it has exactly one stable extension. Our analysis to this point has revealed some of the properties enjoyed by the aggregate argumentation systems. Moreover, these properties form the basis for studying the relation between the individual theories and the aggregate system constructed by taking the union of the defeat relations.
The first result on the relation between the individual and the aggregate argumentation systems, states that the set of skeptically accepted arguments of the individual systems coincides with the skeptically accepted arguments of the aggregate system. Theorem 9. Let T 1 = A, Def 1 and T 2 = A, Def 2 be argumentation systems and U T1,T2 = A,
The relation between the credulous conclusions of the individual and aggregate argumentation systems is more complicated. One relation that holds between the two sets is that the common credulous conclusions of the individual theories are also credulous conclusions of the aggregate system. Theorem 10. Let T 1 = A, Def 1 and T 2 = A, Def 2 be argumentation systems and U T1,T2 = A,
We show in the following that the credulous conclusions of the aggregate theory are in a direct correspondence with the Pareto optimal arguments of the theory.
A general definition of Pareto optimality in the context of argumentation making with multiple criteria, can be given through the notion of dominance. Briefly speaking, a solution dominates another solution if it is better or equally good in all criteria and strictly better in at least one criterion. A solution S is called Pareto optimal, if there is no other solution that dominates S. In our framework, Pareto optimality is defined as follows. Definition 9. Let T 1 = A, Def 1 and T 2 = A, Def 2 be argumentation systems, where Def 1 and Def 2 are defined on the preference relations 1 and 2 respectively. An arguments a ∈ A is Pareto optimal wrt T 1 and T 2 if there is no other argument a ∈ A such that a 1 a and a 2 a or a 2 a and a 1 a. Theorem 11. Let T 1 = A, Def 1 and T 2 = A, Def 2 be argumentation systems and U T1,T2 = A,
iff a is a Pareto optimal argument wrt T 1 and T 2 .
Conclusions and Related Work
This paper proposed a characterization of the outcomes of argumentation-based integrative negotiations. For this reason we considered the "ideal" situation where agents have complete information or negotiate through a mediator. In order to capture this situation we proposed the aggregation of individual negotiation theories, represented as preference-based argumentation theories, and we investigated the properties of the union aggregation of such argumentation systems. Our study of this aggregation operator revealed that it has many desirable theoretical and computational features and therefore it is very suitable for capturing the essence of the integrative negotiation where the key issue is to look for solutions that are "good" for all agents.
Among the presented results, we want to emphasize the fact that the outcomes of the aggregate theory correspond to Pareto optimal solutions wrt the preferences of the individual systems. We also showed that these outcomes, under standard semantics for argumentation, have strong structural properties. For instance, the arguments that belong to the extensions are self-defending, while the skeptical conclusions are exactly those arguments that have no defeaters. These properties translate directly to polynomial time algorithms for credulous and skeptical reasoning. This could be very useful in the situations where the negotiation is made through mediator who receives the arguments of the negotiating parts and tries to find a compromise for them. In the current paper we considered the case of bilateral negotiations by aggregating two agents' theories. The same results apply in the case of several agents as well.
Integrative negotiation has already been studied in the context of multi-agent systems (see e.g. [10, 8] ). However, to our knowledge it is the first time that a theoretical investigation of the characteristics of the outcomes of an argumentation-based integrative negotiation framework has been done. In the future, we will investigate the implications of the ideas presented in [4, 9] for the aggregation of classical Dung's argumentation systems.
